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DELIMITATIONS OF ERIE RAILROAD CO. VS.
TOMPKINS
By SAmuEm H. SiBey*
For two years past the case most cited in the federal courts
has been Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.1 This was a suit at
law for a personal injury negligently inflicted in Pennsylvania.
The action was brought in a federal court in New York, federal
jurisdiction resting on diversity of citizenship. The lower
courts, on the authority of B. & 0. B. R. v. Baugh,2 held the case
controlled by "general law" rather than by the common law of
Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court reversed the decision,
expressly overruling Swift v. Tyson 3 and the many eases springing from it, under which federal courts had in an expanding
field (especially in commercial law and torts) established rules
of decision at variance with those of the states in which the cases
arose, when there were involved no state statutes or constitutions
but only variant views of the common law. The pregnant words
of the opinion in the Erie case are :4
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its legislature or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
State, whether they be local in their nature or general, be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause of the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts."

Justice Reed did not agree that the federal courts in exercising their function of deciding cases in their jurisdiction had proceeded unconstitutionally, although he thought the decisions
questioned were erroneous. But in Ruhlin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.5
he applied the Erie decision as undoubted authority in a case in
equity concerning an insurance policy. Justices Butler and
McReynolds dissented in the Erie case. The latter, however, for
a unanimous court, upheld in an equity case the state common
* United States Circuit Judge, Atlanta, Georgia.
1304 U. S. 64 (1937).
2 149 U. S. 368 (1893).

116 Pet. 1 (1842).
4304 U. S. 64, 78 (1937).
5304 U. S. 202 (1937).
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law on burden of proof as against a contrary rule established in
the federal courts of equity. 6 The doctrine of the Erie case is
firmly established in the Supreme Court.
As the opinion discloses, a main argument against the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, as expanded, was that in diversity of
,itizenship cases, because of different views of the common law,
different results were often reached in the state and federal
courts in substantially identical cases. Thus, for example, a suit
on an insurance policy for less than $3,000 might be won in a
state court, but an identical suit on a policy for more than $3,000
might be removed to the federal court, tried under different
rules of law, and lost. Ordinarily this seems a reproach to
justice, but as will be pointed out later, there are occasions when
the very purpose of the grant of federal jurisdiction is 'to obtain
a different result from that likely to be reached in a state court.
The new rule by which the federal courts are to accept and follow the decisions of the state courts in matters of state law is at
bottom only a new application of the principle of stare decisis.
It will not prove altogether simple. My purpose is to point out
some of the questions that complicate it.
The doctrine in Erie v. Tompkins is manifestly not to be
applied in questions of procedure, but only to matters of substantive law. At the very time it and the Ruhlin cases were
decided the Supreme Court was engaged in formulating the
Rules of Civil Procedure to govern cases at law and equity in the
federal courts, and they differ radically from the procedure in
many state courts. The differences may often spell the difference between success in one jurisdiction and failure in the
other. Many questions will arise as to whether a particular
matter is one of procedure or substantive right.
Such a question arose in the Fifth Circuit in Cities Serrice
Oil Co. v. Dunlap.7 A plea of bona fide purchaser for value
without notice was made by a purchaser of real property rights
in reply to an equity set up by a later purchaser. The asserted
equity was proved, but apparently by oversight, neither side
sought to prove what was paid, or with what knowledge or notice,
in the first sale. The Circuit Court of Appeals" held the
*Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208 (1939).
T Ibid.
s 101 F. (2d) 314 (1939).
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established rule in federal courts of equity to be that the maker
of the plea of bona fide purchaser must sustain it, and that this
was especially reasonable in the present case because the maker
was in court and knew the facts and his opponent, not being a
party to that transaction, did not; and that the matter was one
of procedure and not governed by Eric v. Tompkins. The grant
of a further trial left the way open for the proof to be made. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding the Texas rule of burden of
proof to be a matter of substance. It clearly is if the required
proof cannot be made and the case is to be finally won or lost
on the question who has the burden of proof. In the Cities
Service Co. case the proof could have been easily made by the
maker of the plea, if the plea was true, but his opponent would
probably have had to resort to some sort of discovery. The
placing of the burden in practical effect was only a decision on
the mode of getting available evidence before the court, and it is
not clear why that should not be considered a question of procedure. It may be that the fact that the title to real estate was
involved is the true explanation of the decision, such titles being
peculiarly local.
A similar situation may arise when the question is the admissibility of evidence which will control the case. Rule of
Civil Procedure 43 treats the admissibility of evidence and the
competency of witnesses as mere procedure, laying down most
liberal tests. If, however, hearsay evidence is rigidly excluded
under state law, one ought not to lose his property or be condemned in damages in a federal court because of more liberal
rules of admission in federal practice. In like manner, the parol
evidence rule, a common law matter in most states, is often really
a foundation stone of title, and ought not to be relaxed in such
cases under the federal rule-making power. The same thing may
be true of evidence coming from witnesses incompetent under
state law. It seems to me that rules governing proof are ordinarily procedure and ought to be much influenced by convenience, but that when a case comes to depend on the question
whether a particular piece of evidence exists, or whether a particular witness is competent to testify when none other can be
had, the law applied decides the final outcome of the case and
becomes quite substantial.9 If the exclusion of certain evidence
.III Georgia Bar Journal 16.
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or of a certain witness is really a right under state law, a federal
rule expressly admitting either would be void, because the
Supreme Court is authorized by statute to regulate only forms,
practice and procedure; and by the case of Erie v. Tompkins, it
would be unconstitutional for it to expressly regulate a matter
of substantive right under state law.
2. The doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins has been applied only
in diversity of citizenship cases in which rights arising wholly
under state law were involved. Will it be applied in cases in
which the federal courts are given jurisdiction on other grounds?
If the United States, or an officer threof, or an ambassador, has
a commercial transaction within a state and a dispute about it
comes before a federal court, will the views of the state court
be binding, however freakish they may seem? Will a tort claim
against an ambassador be so dealt with? There is, as yet, no basis
for an answer.
But as to controversies arising under the Constitution,
treaties and laws of the United States, it is plain that Erie v.
Tompkins has no application, certainly not as to the federal
questions themselves. The doctrine relates only to the field of
state law and to transactions governed wholly by that law.
When a federal law controls, its construction and operation are
for unimpeded consideration by the federal courts and so also
is the adjustment of the federal law to the state law where they
impinge or compete. In Board of Commissioners v. United
States,10 the case arose under a federal treaty with Indiana in
violation of which the State of Kansas had collected taxes. One
question was whether the federal statutes and the treaty being
silent as to interest on the claim, the state law denying interest
on such refunds should apply. The state law was held inapplicable, Justice Black dissenting.
The question was interestingly presented in the Fifth Circuit, in Illinois Central R. R. v. Moore.1" An employee, Moore,
sued the railroad company in a state court for damages for discharge contrary to a collective agreement made between a union
of which he was a member and the railroad company. On the
pleadings the state supreme court ruled in Moore's favor, reversing the trial court. Moore then amended to claim more than
U. S.343
"112 F. (2d) 959 (1940).
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$3,000, whereupon the ease was removed to the federal court
for trial. Defenses were there pleaded which raised questions
under the Federal Railroad Labor Act. The district court gave
judgment for Moore, thinking itself bound by the opinion of the
state supreme court. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed by a
divided court, holding that there was no res judicata in the state
supreme court's judgment of reversal. It held that the questions presented were not really questions of state law, because
they related to a collective agreement under the federal statute
and required consideration of its nature and application, as to
which the federal courts are not bound by the opinion of the
state courts under Erie v. Tompkins. The reversal finally turned
on the question of which of two state statutes of limitation was
applicable. The able dissenting judge thought the case within
Erie v. Tompkins because the federal jurisdiction rested only on
diversity of citizenship, the federal questions being injected
defensively, and because the question of limitation was purely
one of state law. The majority thought the ground of removal
immaterial, since the suit was predicated on a collective agreement with an interstate railroad carrier. This agreement existed
under a federal statute and operated in several states and therefore should mean the same thing in all of them; and all questions concerning its nature and operation were federal questions, whether put forward by plaintiff or defendant, and on
them the Supreme Court of the United States has the final word.
The question of limitation, in the opinion of the majority, though
involving state statutes, was not in this case one purely of state
law, because it turned upon the nature of the collective agreement. The federal court thought the agreement was not a contract of employment on which an employee could directly sue, but
that portions of it were adopted into the individual's contract
of employment, and the latter contract was the contract sued
on. The difference between the courts was thus, at last, a difference as to the operation and effect of the agreement made and
maintained under a federal statute.
In Moore's case it was conceded that the effect as res judicata
of a state court's judgment in another case was purely a question of state law. Other questions were independently considered,
but the conclusions reached were in accord with the views of the
state supreme court, so that no conflict occurred requiring a
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decision whether these questions were so far distinct from the
federal questions as to be within Erie v. Tompkins.
Another recent case in the Fifth Circuit is Cone, Gover?ior v. Rorick,12 in which the bill raised the question whether
certain state statutes passed since public bonds were issued
impaired the obligation of the bond contract. A three-judge
court applied Erie v. Tompkins and followed a recent decision of
the Florida Supreme Court upholding the statutes. On appeal
to the Supreme Court, 13 the applicability of Erie v., Tompkins
was not decided, but the case was held not a proper one for three
judges. The district judge then sustained the bill and granted
an interlocutory injunction. The Circuit Court of Appeals'"
held that what the bond contract was, and whether the attacked
statutes impaired its obligation, were federal questions on which
federal courts would make their own judgments, inclining to
agreement with the state court in doubtful matters; and that
Erie v. Tompkins had no application unless in settling the meaning of the attacked statutes. One judge thought that -the question what the bond contract was was not a question on which the
federal court was free to exercise independent judgment.
These instances show that a fertile field of controversy
exists touching what cases or parts of cases Erie v. Tompkins
will control.
3. Another interesting angle is the effect of a state supreme
court decision on a controversy, which subsequently gets into the
federal court. If the state court decision amounts to res judicata,
it, of course, ends the controversy on familiar principles. If it
does not, its standing as the law of the case, and under Erie v.
Tompkins remains to be considered. In Wichita Royalty Co. v.
City Bank 15 the case while in the state courts went to the Texas
Supreme Court and was reversed, the court stating, for the first
time in important respects, the applicable Texas common law.
The case was then amended so as to become removable and was
tried in the federal court. On appeal, the Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the judgment of reversal in the Texas Supreme
Court was not res judicata and that it ought to have been treated
- 112 P. (2d) 894 (1940).
23307 U. S.208 (1938).

14112 F. (2d) 894 (1940).
95 F. (2d) 671 (1938), 97 F. (2d) 249 (1938); Affd. 306 U. S.103
(1938).
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in the trial court as the law of the case. It held, also, that the
Circuit Court of Appeals stood in the place of the Texas Supreme
Court as the appellate court, with the same right to correct a
misstatement of the law; that the law had been misstated in
some particulars; and that Erie v. Tompkins did not prevent correction because the Supreme Court of Texas had since changed
its position. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed
all these conclusions save the last and held that the Supreme
Court of Texas had not retracted nor unsettled its opinion, which
should be followed. The case came again to the Circuit Court of
Appeals where, expressing dissatisfaction at applying Erie v.
Tompkins to a state decision made first in the very controversy,
the direction of the Supreme Court to follow it was respected.
A certiorari has been refused. Only state law was directly
involved in the questions decided.
In Illinois Central B. R. Co. v. Moore' 6 a similar situation
existed, but because federal questions were at issue, the state
decision was not followed.
4. That the federal courts, when administering purely state
law, should apply it as the state courts applied it at the time the
rights at issue arose is reasonable and just. That they should
blindly follow a state court ruling made after the litigated contractor transaction arose, and especially in the very controversy,
is not so clear. We are reminded of many cases in the past where
federal courts have refused to follow changes in the rulings of
state courts, even on state statutes and constitutions, in deciding
rights arising previous to the change. On the last appeal of the
Wichita Royalty Co.' 7 ease a unanimous court said:
"We would not be free to follow our views of what the law (of
Texas) ought to be, but we should seek to find what in fact it was when
the instant case arose. Unless the federal courts may do this, the purpose of removal, and indeed of the constitutional grant of jurisdiction
to federal courts in some sort of cases, will be jeopardized. Jurisdiction is granted the federal courts in cases affecting ambassadors and
other public ministers, in controversies between two states, or a state
and citizens of another state, between citizens of different states, and
citizens claiming land under grants of different states, and between a
state or its citizens and foreign states, citizens and subjects (Const.,
Art. III, See. 2), although the cases may involve only the application
of state law, because it was thought justice would better be served
thereby. Injustice may occur as often-and more subtly-by wrongly
stating the law as by wrongly finding the facts. A federal court ought
not to be bound by the statement of the law made by a state court in
3'112

17306

F. (2d) 959 (1940).
U. S. 103 (1938), Supra, n. 15.
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the very controversy over which jurisdiction has been vested in the
federal courts. The removal of a case for local prejudice may occur at
any time before final trial. Can it be supposed that statements of the
law In the state courts in that very case would bind the federal courts,
especially federal appellate courts? We believe so to hold would be not
merely to belittle unduly the federal courts, but to renounce a part of
the substance of their constitutional jurisdiction."

It seems the views so expressed are sound. They have not
been considered by the Supreme Court, and of course in the
Wich ita Royalty Co. case there was no question of local prejudice.
That case cannot be taken as closing them.
5. In the quotation made above from the opinion in Erie v.
Tompkins, it is said: "And whether the law of the state shall
be declared by its legislature in a statute or by its highest court
in a decision is not a matter of federal concern."
I take it
that it is only a decision of the highest state court that binds
absolutely the federal courts. A decision in a state trial court is
not a binding precedent in another court, state or federal. A
decision of an intermediate appellate court, whatever its force in
lower state courts, does not establish the state law in the federal
courts, especially the federal appellate courts. It is only the
highest court of the state that speaks with final authority as to
what the state law is. A federal court should carefully consider the decisions from every state court, in the effort to find
the state law, but is concluded only by the highest.
6. The statement, "There is no federal general common
law," must be accepted with some caution. The following words:
"Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a state.. . . And no clause on the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts," show
that what is meant is that there is no federal common or unwritten law in matters power over which is wholly vested in the
states. In fields where Congress has power, there is a federal
unwritten law, drawn, as the unwritten law of the states originafly was, from the great stream of the English common law,
and in those fields it is the function of the federal courts to
declare and apply it uniformly throughout the United States.
The "common law" is twice expressly mentioned in the Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution, and from the beginning the
terms and the principles of the common law at the time of
American independence have been taken as the background of
constitutional interpretation. To state it more accurately, the
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English common law, so far as applicable to its situation, became
the common law of each state at the time of its independence.
This general common law, similar in all the states, was in view
at the shortly subsequent adoption of the federal constitution.
The same thing is true of federal statutes in fields of federal
power. The gaps in statutory provisions are filled from the
common law. Sometimes state law operates until Congress
speaks, and where it does, Erie v. Tompkins may apply. But in
the field of interstate commerce it was flatly held, in Davis v.
Chicago, M. and St. P. R. R. Co.,18 that in the absence of legislation by Congress resort was to be had to the "common law."
Certainly when Congress does legislate about interstate bills of
lading, or interstate carriers' liability to their employees, the
background on which the courts will interpret and apply the
statutes is not the unwritten law of a particular state, but the
"general common law," necessarily as part of the law of the
United States. Thus, the "common law" was drawn on to explain and make workable the Sherman Anti-trust Act. 19 Note
the reliance on it and its principle of growth and change as to
evidence in criminal cases in Funk v. United States.20 Instances
could be multiplied. English settlers everywhere have carried
with them the common law so far as suited to their new conditions, because it was to them the expression of reason and justice
in their social and political relations. 'When in the United
States they, as citizens, assumed a dual relation to government,
the state regulating and governing some things and the United
States other things, it was as natural and as necessary that the
general principles of the common law severally applicable should
be looked to in the one sphere as in the other, for in both they
stood for reason and justice. Federal courts in the field of
federal law must continue to draw on these principles as they
have hitherto done; and though never expressly adopted by
Congress, they do, in a real sense, constitute and ever growing
federal common law, better established and often redefined by
the judicial applications made as the years go by.

Wis. 470, 57 A. S. R. 935 (1896).
Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 221 U. S. 1 (1910).
•290 U. S. 371 (1933).
393

"

